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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
sTNl'E OF UTAH, by and through I 
its HOAD COl\t\HSSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IVOR D . .JONES and RUA C . 
. TONES, his wife, and STATE 
BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
Drffndants and Rfspondfnts. 
) 
Case No. 11801 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case deals with a condemnation action wherein 
the plaintiff and appellant herein condemned portions of 
land owned by defendants, I Yor D. Jones and Rua C. 
Jones, his ·wife, in connection with the construction of 
Iuterstat<> Highway rn. The land is located between 
City, Utah, and Summit, Utah. The defendants 
did not protest the rio·ht of the State of Utah to con-t-> 
demn the property and sometime prior to the date of 
the trial the Court entered an order of immediate occu-
pancy permitting- the plaintiff and appellant to occupy 
the property. r:l'he trial was for the sole purpose of de-
2 
termining the damages sustained to the <lefondanh; aiid 
respondents herein as a resnlt of the taking. 
STATEMEl'-JT OI7 F:":-CTS 
Respondents feel that it \Yill he of considerable ben-
efit to the Court to set forth herein a statement of facts 
pertinent to the issues. Tlw respondents' statement is 
to provide facts in addition to those set forth in the: 
appellant's statement as to the disposition in the Lower 
Court. 
Plaintiff-appellant's statement of facts fail to 
disclose the defendants-respondents, Ivor D. ,Jones and 
Rua C. Jones, bis 'wife, i11 connection ·with their son anr1 
business associates in Las Vegas, Nevada, had pro-
ceeded with the development of a subdivision on por-
tions of the property owned by defendants-respondents. 
The subdivision, as originally planned, included the 
parcels of property identified in the plaintiff-appellant's 
statement of facts and also included the tracts of land 
which were severed b.v the construction of I-15. 
U. S. Highway 91, which is the highway which has 
been in existence for mm1y years and which was the 
highway serving the area from Cedar City north to 
Summit, Utah, bisected the property owned by defend-
ants-respondents. The portion of the defendantFi-respon-
dents' property which was contemplated as the area to 
be subdivided was situated in the area which \ms hi-
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serted by U. S. Highway !H. This property was easily 
aeecssibie from U. S. Highway 91. 
Dcfendants-responclents, and their associates, had 
been substantially involved in the subdivision develop-
ment for a considerable period before they were advised 
that Interstate Higfrway 15 ·would be bisecting their 
property. Preliminary plans had heen made, engineer-
ing, surveys and reports as ·well as preliminary draw-
ings of the subdivision had been completed. Defendants-
respondents contacted the plaintiff-appellant as soon as 
they and their associates were aware that the Inter-
state Highway System may bisect their property. At the 
time of the initial contact with the official representa-
tives of the plaintiff-appellant by defendants-respon-
dents and their associates, there appeared to be no cer-
tain route established as to where the highway would 
bisect the subject property. To eliminate the confu-
sion that the defendants-respondents knew ·would result 
from the new highway travelling through the proposed 
subdivision and the limitation on access rights in con-
nection therewith, the defendants-respondents abandoned 
that portion of the snbdiYision situated at or near the 
route which ·was determined to be the most probable 
route of Interstate I-15. All that portion of the pro-
posed subcliYision situated sonth ancl east of the existing 
Highway 01 was abandoned and the plans progressed on 
seheclule with the remaining portion of the subdivision 
situated north and west of Hig·hway 91. 
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At the time the Court entered the order of imme-
diate occupancy, the subdivision of the defendants-re-
spondents and their known as ''Village Green 
F'arms'' had progressed to the :point where the subdi-
Yision plats had b8en approved by the County Uornmis-
sioners and the interested parties had proceeded with 
sales of subdivision lots. 
It should also be clarified that substantially all of 
the defendants-respondents', Ivor D. Jones and Rua C. 
Jones', property in the parcel owned by them in the area 
between Cedar City and Summit, Utah, is flat grazing 
land except those portions of property contemplated in ' 
the original subdiYision which are situated up near the 
low hills which parallel the highway. The property 
planned for the original subdivision on the east and 
south side of the old high·way (this is the property sub-
sequently abandoned) has small rolling hills and a grad-
ual slope upward with a view of the entire valley from 
almost any location en the property. 
Plaintiff-appellant's statement of facts outlines the 
parcels specifically b:.- number and acres and the eff"ect 
of the condemnation on each. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court did not err in allowing the clef end-
ants' testimony respecting values of property. In fact, 
•> 
the testimony as presentecl was not as characterized by 
u pp<' llaut ''on a sn hdi Yision ha sis." The testimony of 
fror D .• Tone;.; ( rrr. eommencing p. 28) discloses that the 
pro1ierty a ctn ally taken, m; well as the property severed 
011 i he sou tl1 and east of the highway, was to have been 
in the original snbdivi8ion. The testimony further 
,.,hows that the s11bdivision which did in fact develop was 
ad,jacc'nt to which was to become and later 
<licl become an access road or frontage road used in con-
nection with the Int<:'rstat0 Highway System. 
Ivor D .. Jones testified that in his judgment the 
property had a value based upon its highest and best 
use at the time of taking of $1,500.00 per acre (Tr. 29). 
The testimony of l\Iarcellus Palmer (Tr. commenc-
rng page 49) outlined the methods of appraisal which 
were evaluated by him i11 connection with the subject 
propert>- and discloses the type of appraisal or approach 
to the appraisal placed upon the property by this wit-
11ess. The testimony of Mr. Palmer as to the method of 
or approach to the appraisal coincides with the judg-
ment of the plaintiff-appellant's expert witness, Mr. Ken 
\Villiam Esplin. They hoth nsed what they defined to 
be tlw market-data method or approach to appraisal. 
('outran· to the claim of plaintiff-appellant that 
the defendant failed to prodnee any acceptable e,·idence 
('f nllue on the subject the> testimony clearly 
established that both Mr. Ivor D. Jones and Mr. l\far-
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cellus Palmer determined that the highest arn1 h0st llR(' 
of the property would be "rural homesit0 pro11<'rh" 
(Tr. 50). 
Mr. l\Iarcellus Palmer's testimony c1iseloses that 
he was eminently qualified to appraise the suhject prop-
erty and that he was Yery familiar ·with tli0 g0neral nrea, 
having appraised properties in c0nnectio11 with Ii 
operations, farming operations, grazmg operations, 
mountain and rural subdiYision de\-elopments and rural 
homesite developments. 
Mr. Palmer testified that he was aware of, exam-
ined and considered, the comparable sales of property 
in and about the Iron Connty and Southern utah area. 
Based upon his examination of the subject property and 
his knowledge gained from his investigation respecting 
other properties in the area, he formulated a judgment 
that the highest and best use of the subject property at 
the time the condemnation action was commenced was 
for the development of homesites. The Yalne established 
by Mr. Palmer, based upon its highest and best use for 
the property was $] ,490.00 per acre for the acreage 
taken. 
We believe that defendants-respondents' approach 
to establish the value assessed to the subject prop-
erty falls well within the outline of the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of State of Utalt rs. Tedesco, 4 Utah 
2d 248, 291 Pac. 2d 1028. In the Tedesco case, the de-
i'endant 's expert 1Yitncsscs had apparently "arrived at 
tl1ei r dctc rmination as tu the \'alue of the property hy 
tlw sales prie<•s of comparable 1011' in thr ,·icinity, 
a . .;siµning sneh nllnrs to the individual lots involved in 
tlwt litigation, aml adding thrm up, without 
a11y cost or expenHe incident to tlw i'iale of <:>ach of the 
lots at the time \Yithin wl1icli the lots have been 
sold.'' In the instant case, the expert "·itness compared 
the ,·alue of the lots in the adjacent snhdiYision, which 
\ms the sn hdivision of which the subject property was 
to originally been a part, deducted from the aver-
age price of said lots the cost of water, the cost of engi-
neering, the cost of s11hdi,·ision planning, de\·elopment 
and filing, deducted therefrom the commission costs an-
ticipatin{-\· the sah• of lots a means whereby commis-
sions would he required anc1 thereafter, deducted an ad-
ditional amount for othrr contingencies and profit. The 
r<:>maining nilue was, in the judgment of the expert wit-
nt>ss, the priC'c that a reasonahlr buyer would b<:> willing 
to pay for the subject The expert witness for 
the defendants c1ic1 in fact dN1nct all such items as ap-
1wared to ht> oh.iertionahle to the Conrt in the State 1'8. 
T e1frsr·o case. 
Plaintiff-appellant argues that the Yalu<' of the prop-
should he based upon a sing-le unit, regardless of 
\YhateYer the state of compl<'tion of a subdivision may 
he, and a fair market Yalue is the price that such prop-
erty will bring from a pnrehasing; the whole 
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tract. The testimony of Mr. Palmer was elearly to tbi, 
effect. Mr. Palmer established that, based Hpon his in-
vestigation of the entire area arnl after a determination 
of what salc8 to use as comparable sales, he madt• tht: 
necessary and appropriate adjustments to determine the 
\·alue of the ground per acre and placed an aggn•gah• 
value on the total acreage predicated upon the number 
of acres times the Yalne prr acre. Contrary to the claim 
of plaintiff-appellant that such an approach results in 
a realization of a prof it on the property, the teHtimony 
clearly shows that tlw deduetions were made to reduce 
the value to raw acreage, extracting therefrom the profit 
and all other costs incurred and reasonably assessed i11 
increasing the comparable property to the market Yalne 
it then enjoyed. 
Esplin, the expert witness called by the plain-
tiff-appellant, testified that he disregarded any Yalue 
whatsoever to the subdi,·ision adjoining the subject prop-
erty. He indicated that he determined that in his best 
judgment the highest and best use of the subject prop-
erty was for grazing and for a livestock operation and 
no value whatsoever could he attributed to the suhcfo·i-
sion adjacent thereto. 
The case of State of rrtnh, by a11d tl1ro1u1l1 its Ronrl 
Commission 1·. Rulo11 8. 1Food, (22 Utah 2d .'J17, 45? Pac. 
872) clearly on page 87:5 lhereof 'that the 
landowner is entitled to share in an,v general enhance-
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ment which affects the land in the area up to the time 
of the taking.'' Thr Court in the ·wood case refers to 
and reaffirms the position taken by the Utah Supreme 
Conrt in the case of State, by nnd through its Road Com-
mission c . .JacolJs, lU Utah 2d 167, 397 Pac. 2d 463, 
wherein it was heltl that the owner is entitled to the eval-
uation of his property at the time it was taken on the 
basis of the highest and best nse and that is "without 
limitation as to the nse then actually made of it.'' 
The State's witness, Mr. Esplin, failed to offer any 
explanation whatsoe\'er as to the difference between the 
subject property and the property adjacent thereto in 
the subdivision. He testified that in his opinion the 
subject property had a value of $50.00 per acre and 
that its Yalue was not increased by the fact that it was 
adjacent to a subdivision of lots of 1.25 acres each, sell-
ing for $2,150.00 to $2,250.00 per lot. 
Mr. Palmer's testimony on behalf of the landowner, 
established that he had considered many facors in the 
surrounding area, including other comparable properties, 
properties purchased for subdiYision purposes and prop-
erties purchased for other purposes. Based upon his 
investigation and e''alnation of possible comparable 
sales, he established the foundation for his judgment as 
to the value of the with the adjustments as 
hereinabove ref erred. Contrarywise, Mr. Esplin, the 
expert called to testify on behalf of the plaintiff, estab-
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lished a value arbitrarily upon a jud;.!,ment that tlH' lanu 
in question had one use and one' use that for 
grazing and/or livestock operations, and disreganle><l 
any influence that the <leYelopment or other use lwing-
made of 8Urronnding properties. ·we feel that this 
contrary to the intent of +lw 8fofr' r. TVowl and 8tntr 
r. Jacobs cases lwrein he fore ci tcd. 
POINT II 
That counsel for defendants-respondents clo<'s not 
agree with plaintiff-appellant's position that the ladies ' 
of the jury were confused. The evidence clearly estab- 1 
lishecl that there was indeed a substantial loss to the 
defendants-respondents. There is little doubt that the 
jury determined the valne of the ground to be far in 
excess of the value placed upon the same by Mr. Esplin. 
The jury personally visited the property in the presence 
of the Judge and had an opportunity to vie\v the subject 
properties for themselYes an<l determined that the sub-
ject property being taken hy the T nterstate Hig"11way 
and the property being severed from the remaining 
property aml left in three small parcels to the sonth and 
east of the interstate highway with limited access, was 
in fact property that had a much higher and better use 
than most of the remaining acreage. This property was 
located on a sloping hillside with an excellent view of 
the entire valley. It was adjacent to the "Village Green 
Farm'' subdivision which was in the process of develop-
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meut at the time the jury visited the property. The 
p\·idence also elearly establishes that the actual property 
se\·ered and left in the three small parcels on the south 
and east of thr interstate highway was acreage which, 
because of its location and excellent view, was of even 
higlier Yalue per acre than the actual acreage taken by 
the highway. 
It was equall;· clear that the small parcels of the 
subject property remaining on the south and east of 
the new Interstate Highway T-15 would have little or 
limited use. The only aceess to the small remaining par-
cels after the completion of the highway will be by trav-
el through a linstock underpass some distance from the 
parcels and rrturn by frontag;e road. The parcels were 
rach isolated from the other and each too small to have 
any substantial value for the purpose that the property 
was intended prior to the taking. Every witness indi-
cated that there would be a ,-ery substantial reduction 
in the ,-aluc of the property on the east and south of 
I-15 which was cut off and separated from the balance 
the new highway. The n1lne the jury placed on the 
se\·erance was wrll below the ,-alue of the same as indi-
C'ated by ::\Ir .• Jones and Mr. Palmer and also compatable 
with the testimon>· of Mr. who indicated that the 
rnlne wonlcl hr reduced hy fifty percent of thr ,-alue oi 
the propert>· before the takinp;. The verdict of the jury 
as to the ,-alnr of the io;everance loss waio; founded on a 
sound and reasonable interpretation b>- them of the eYi-
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deuce before them. 
The verdict of th<' ;1ury is clear that it was tlw de-
sire of the ladies acting as jurors in this cause to recog-
nize and !.!,Tant to the defendants-respondents a sum in 
the amount of .. 921.:-rn to compensate them for tlw 
total loss sustained to them as a result of the Interstate 
Highway 15 their property. 
It is not a proper conclusion for the plaintiff-appel-
lant to infer that because defendants-respondents did 
not object or protest the adion of the trial court in re-
ducing the judgment to $8,000.00 as an inference that 
the jury was confused or that the defendants-respon-
dents acquiesced and agreed to the reduction. 
A reading of the Trial Court's finding No. 12 will 
disclose that the Trial Court reduced the judgment from 
$13,921.30 to an arbitrary figure of $8,000.00. The find-
ing further states that ''in the event the defendants file 
objections thereto within fifteen days of the date hereof 
that a new trial will he granted.'' The finding goes on 
to state that ''if no objections were filed, the Clerk is 
directed to enter judgment for defendants.'' The fact 
that defendants concluded that the additional cost of a 
trial with the high cost of expert fees, testimony, counsel 
fees and expenses wonld be sufficiently high to consume 
a major portion of tlw difference between the $13,921.30 
and the $8,000.00 is certainly not sufficient to infer that 
the defendants-respondents acquiesced and agreed to the 
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reduction. This was simply a judgment made in the 
matter based upon the practicalities involved in any 
type of litigation. 
The defendants-respondents assert that the action 
of the Trial Judge in reducing the judgment from the 
verdict awarded by the jury of $13,921.30 to $8,000.00 
was in fact an error by the Trial Judge. However, based 
upon the wording of the Court's findings, the def end-
ants-respondents were placed in the very awkward posi-
tion of either agreeing to the amount even though not 
agreeing to the justification for the reduction, or hav-
ing a new trial on the case "-ith the> expenses and costs 
attendant thereto. 
The defendants-respondents assert that the error 
of the Lower Court should he rectified by a reinstate-
ment of the original verdict of $13,921.30. The Courts 
in the State of Utah have upheld the right of a trial 
judge to overrule the verdict of a jury where the verdict 
is clearly unjust. However, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah has indicated on many occasions that the 
verdict of the jury should not be interfered with unless 
there appears some compelling reason why justice de-
mands that it be done. In the case of Campbell v. Safe-
way Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 113, 388 Pac. 2d 409, 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah set aside an or-
der granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, with 
the following- comments : 
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''Due to their a<lvantuged pus1t1011 in clo:-;e 
proximity to the trial, the partie::-; and the 
es; and their practical know ledge of the aff air8 ot ' 
life as a backgrouml again::-;t which tu weigh the , 
evidence, the asse::-;sme11t of damage's is ::-;omethi11 ,, "' peculiarly within the of the jmy to UP-
termine, aud the court is extremely reluctant to 
interfere 'Yith their judgment i11 regard. 
From the plaintiil 's point of view, their insistence 
that the a"·anl is inadequate to her needs and <le-
sires is uuderstan<lable but we are obliged to look 
at the e\·iclence and the reasonable inference::-; to 
he drawn therefrom in the light most f m·orahlP 
to the ver<lict. In doing so, we do not see it • 
so extremely lw:·ond reason as to ref!nire that we 
upset it." 
The Court in the Campbell case \\·ent on to statr 
that: 
''Under our s:·stern it is contemplated that the 
right to trail b:· jur:· be assured. This is some-
thing more than a high-sounding phrase to be de-
claimed on patriotic ocrasions. It is the duty of 
courts to honor it in the observance. \Vhenever 
there is a genuine dispute as to the issues of the 
fact upon which the parties' rights depend, they 
are entitled to have them submitted to and settled 
by a jun·. \Vhen the parties have had a fnll ancl 
fair opportnnity to present their cause, and the 
jury has rendered its verdict, it should not be in-
terfered with unless there appeari-; some compell-
ing reason wh:· jni-;ticc demands tlrnt it b0 done." 
The parties in the instant case each fairly present-
ed testimon:r respecting· th0 damages r0snlting to the 
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defendants-respondents in connection with the highway 
condemnation proceedings to the jury empaneled in Iron 
County, Utah, for the determination of the facts in the 
instant case. A re,·iew of the testimony discloses that 
there was a genuine dispute as to the issues and the 
yalues. The parties and each of them were, therefore, 
entitled to have the case submitted to the jury and set-
tled by the jury. The verdict of the jury rendered 
thereafter should not be interfered with. There appears 
no just or compelling reason that would demand such 
interference. Consequently, it is the position of the 
defendants-respondents that the Court erred in reduc-
mg the judgment. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has up-
held the right of a District Court to order a remittiter 
or a new trial as was set forth herein. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah as particularly set forth in 
Ruf v. Association of World Tra1:el Exchange, 10 Utah 
2d 249, 351 Pac. 2d 623, has upheld the right of the Su-
preme Court to order a remittiter of all or part of a 
jury verdict; provided, however, the requirement of the 
Ruf case is that the award be "obYiously above any 
reasonable appraisal in the damages suffered.'' In the 
instant case, the testimony of the def endants-respon-
dents' witnesses would appear to ha Ye been received by 
the jury as more reasonable than the testimony and 
evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant. Conse-
quently, there is ample evidence before the Court for 
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the jury to base its verdict as determined herein in the 
amount of $13,921.30. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants - respondents submit that the Trial 
Court's judgment reducing the verdict of the jury from 
$13,921.30 to $8,000.00 should be set aside and the ver-
dict heretofore rendered by the jurors in this cause be 
reinstated, that judgment be entered on said verdict ac-
cordingly, with costs to these respondents; or, in the 
alternative, that the Court affirm the judgment of the 
lower Court as to the judgment of $8,000.00, with costs 
to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, JACKSON & JACKSON' 
Attorneys for Respondents 
